Canary prompts expose AI hosts: OpenRouter drops three providers
Security researchers sent around two million booby-trapped requests to AI services. Data got copied, forwarded and even abused, even though providers had promised not to store it. OpenRouter has now removed three providers and stripped 125 endpoints of their zero data retention status.

What's going on
OpenRouter is a broker for AI models. When you send a request, the answer comes from one of many hosting providers running models like DeepSeek, MiniMax, GLM or Kimi on their own servers. It's convenient because a single API gives you access to dozens of models and providers. Many business customers deliberately pick only providers that offer Zero Data Retention (ZDR), a promise that prompts and responses won't be stored.
On November 22, 2026, OpenRouter announced that it had removed three inference providers (the companies that actually run the models) from its platform and revoked ZDR eligibility for 125 endpoints. An endpoint is the individual access point for a specific model at a specific provider. OpenRouter says it has notified every customer who may have been affected, but it hasn't said how many users or conversations are involved.
The trigger was an investigation by security firm Dragos, published on November 19, 2026. According to OpenRouter, its own platform was neither hacked nor accessed without authorization. The problem sat with the providers behind it.
How the researchers tracked the leaks
According to unite.ai, Dragos sent around two million prompts to popular AI services between July and November 2026. Every request contained canaries: decoys that raise an alarm as soon as someone uses them, such as single-use web addresses or fake credentials. If someone opens one of those URLs or tries a decoy key, you know exactly which request it came from and when it was sent. Think of it as the digital version of marked bills.
The results were clear. Data was exposed at at least three AI providers. Marketplace intermediaries saw customer prompts through ordinary logging and kept them. Some providers apparently ignored privacy settings or their own published policies. According to hacks.gr, one test message sent to a US provider turned up 24 days later in a company chat in China.
The biggest case involved a few hundred planted AWS keys, the credentials for Amazon's cloud. They were sent in several short windows in late October 2026 and then used for tens of thousands of AWS API calls. Some of those keys came from requests that had been rejected before a model ever ran. Dragos concludes that the data was copied as soon as it reached the provider, not during processing.
The problem with detours
The findings on routing, the path a request takes, are especially troubling. Requests often don't go straight to the data center. They pass through several hops, and every company along the way can see the full prompt and response. Dragos traced about 2,000 of these paths. Several hundred involved an unidentified system. In a handful of cases, the test image was fetched by a company that wasn't on the stated route at all.
Dragos also reports that between July and October 2026, systems at an unnamed Chinese AI lab fetched secret URLs from more than half of the prompts sent to its models. About two thirds of those prompts were explicitly flagged as "no data collection" or ZDR.
Three providers, three different incidents
OpenRouter's public list links to statements from Novita, Phala and Together AI. According to unite.ai, though, the company doesn't explicitly say these are the three providers it removed. Not every affected provider has published a statement. The three reports describe very different causes:
| Provider | Cause according to its own statement | Affected period | Models |
|---|---|---|---|
| Novita | A faulty routing configuration sent requests to the official MiniMax API instead of Novita's own servers | May 28 to November 11, 2026 | MiniMax models |
| Phala | Attack via an outdated, publicly reachable service | October 21 (00:00 UTC) to November 8, 2026 (05:35 UTC) | DeepSeek V4 Flash 0731 |
| Together AI | An AI coding agent published an access key on GitHub | mainly June 24 and July 4, 8 and 14, 2026 | MiniMax M3, GLM-5.2, Kimi K2.6 |
Novita: A forwarding path meant only for certain customers ended up covering more requests than intended because of a configuration error. As a result, MiniMax requests went to MiniMax itself. Content sent directly through Novita or via OpenRouter may have been viewed or stored by third parties. The researchers saw the test URLs being accessed but no use of the AWS decoy keys. Automated content screening may have been behind it, and Novita says it's looking into this with MiniMax. The affected models have been taken offline.
Phala: Phala advises anyone whose requests reached it via OpenRouter during that period to treat the content as exposed and rotate any secrets it contained. The attacker combined an outdated, internet-facing service with management interfaces that blindly trusted any access from the local machine ("loopback") without checking the caller. Using a similar trick, the attacker took over a virtual machine running the model and could read requests while they were being processed. Decoy abuse is only confirmed for October 21 and 22. Phala is sticking with the wider window anyway, since the tests were only spot checks. The attack has been contained since November 8, and a full root-cause analysis is due to follow.
Together AI: Here the culprit was an AI coding agent, an AI that writes and pushes code on its own. It committed an access key for a private Hugging Face repository to a public GitHub repository called xorl. An unauthorized party used the key to download stored prompt samples. Together had collected them for software testing and says it had permission to do so. The attacker searched the samples specifically for credentials to other services and tried them out, including five Dragos decoys. Together says it will introduce short-lived or tightly scoped credentials, secret scanning on every code change, ZDR by default for new accounts and new rules for AI coding agents. It's still working out which customers need to be notified directly.
What OpenRouter is changing and what you should do
OpenRouter stresses that blocking the 125 endpoints is a precaution and doesn't mean 125 confirmed violations. The company is adopting the researchers' testing method for its own ongoing checks. It also plans to verify technically which network paths requests actually take, so it can spot forwarding to third parties. Removed endpoints will only get ZDR eligibility back after they provide the right assurances and pass a review.
If you got a notification, check what you sent during the affected periods. If it included passwords, API keys or other credentials, change them right away. Then check the activity logs of the affected accounts for anything unusual.
Analysis
The case exposes a weakness that often gets overlooked in practice: ZDR is usually a promise, not a verified state. If you use a marketplace like OpenRouter for cheap access to open models, you're trusting a whole chain of companies, most of which you've never heard of. Decoys were abused even from rejected requests, and prompts turned up at companies that weren't on the stated route. Both findings badly undermine that trust.
On the plus side, independent testing uncovered the leaks, and some of the affected providers have explained in detail what happened. Plenty of questions remain, though. It's unclear exactly which three providers were removed, how many customers are affected and which Chinese lab fetched the secret URLs. It also remains to be seen whether ongoing spot checks will catch errors like these before real customer data is exposed.
The Together AI case stands out because an AI coding agent caused the leak itself. That makes the old rule more important than ever: secrets like passwords and keys don't belong in prompts, no matter what any provider promises.
Sources
- dev.to #ai dev.to
- unite.ai unite.ai
- Reddit r/artificial reddit.com
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